Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking to the United Nations Security Council on Jan. 26, called on “every other nation to pick a side” and to “stand with the forces of freedom” in the standoff between President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Juan Guaidó, the head of the country’s National Assembly, who declared his interim presidency on Jan. 23 and quickly won the support of the United States and many other countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Since Mr. Pompeo’s speech, the United States has put further pressure on the Maduro government, imposing new oil sanctions and reiterating that “all options” — including, presumably, military intervention — “are on the table.” John Bolton, President Trump’s national security adviser, was photographed this week holding a notepad with “5,000 troops to Colombia” written on it.
The situation in Venezuela is desperate. Protests continue, both Mr. Maduro and Mr. Guaidó claim their presidential legitimacy, and a deterioration could pile more political violence onto a country that is already suffering from a demolished economy. Something must change.
But the United States has no constructive role to play in Venezuela’s political crisis. Regardless of how one feels about Mr. Maduro, it’s clear that Washington is not a trustworthy partner in pushing for regime change. The Trump administration’s actions — and its personnel — recall the long and sordid history of United States intervention in Latin America.
Throughout the 20th century, the United States frequently intervened in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, which it considers part of its geopolitical backyard. “I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men,” Woodrow Wilson said in 1913. Other presidents paternalistically assumed that they knew how to improve political situations in the region. The result was rarely democracy and stability.
During the Cold War, a pattern emerged. Washington mobilized covert resources to support opposition to left-wing governments. In 1954, the C.I.A. trained a small invasion force to remove President Jacobo Árbenz of Guatemala, who had redistributed land belonging to the United Fruit Company. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson was prepared to provide support to the Brazilian military during its coup against President João Goulart, though the coup succeeded without it. In the early 1970s, Richard Nixon’s administration helped undermine the government of the socialist Salvador Allende in Chile before he, too, was deposed in a military coup.
In such cases, regime change was celebrated by the United States as the restoration of democracy. But Guatemala saw the reversal of the agrarian and other reforms, followed by decades of civil conflict. Brazil had 21 years of military dictatorship, and Chile, 17. Torture and repression were essential tools of those governments.
And worryingly, the Cold Warriors are back. Leading Washington’s policy on Venezuela right now is Mr. Bolton, who served in Ronald Reagan’s administration. The White House has named as a special envoy for Venezuela Elliott Abrams, who, while working in the Reagan administration, excused human rights abuses committed by United States-trained forces in Central America. “I’ve been a counterrevolutionary for a long time,” Mr. Abrams said in 1986.
But if Mr. Maduro is eager to wear the mantle of the aggrieved leftist menaced by American imperialism, it fits him poorly. Millions of Venezuelans have left the country in recent years, creating a regional refugee crisis. People are suffering from hunger and a lack of access to medicine and basic goods. The economy has shrunk by half in five years, and inflation in 2018 reached 1,000,000 percent. Opposition to the Maduro government extends to all classes of Venezuelans.
In a reversal of the region’s most typical Cold War pattern, it is Mr. Maduro’s supposedly socialist government that relies on paramilitary violence to maintain power. China and Russia, which still support the Maduro government, are no less interested in profiting from Venezuela’s oil than the United States.
It is as yet unclear how directly the United States shaped Mr. Guaidó’s decision to challenge Mr. Maduro’s authority. In December, he met secretly with officials in the United States, Colombia and Brazil, all governed by right-wing governments. But what is clear is that support for Mr. Guaidó — or at least for an alternative to Mr. Maduro — extends beyond the right. Mr. Guaidó was recognized as interim president by most members of the Lima Group — including Peru, Canada, Ecuador and Argentina — a body formed in 2017 to seek a peaceful resolution to the Venezuelan crisis.
Even if Mr. Guaidó did coordinate his declaration with the United States, the popular discontent that he channels is real. Many Venezuelans are eager to find help wherever they can, even if that means a Trump administration that is hardly known for its hostility to dictatorship or its commitment to human rights.
This is a vulnerability for the opposition. Washington is all too ready to lend a hand, but in doing so it could — as it has so many times in Latin America’s history — cause more harm than good.
Mr. Maduro will use United States intervention to rally his remaining domestic and internal support under an anti-imperialist banner, drawing parallels with Washington’s long history in the region. United States intervention would also undermine the prospect for the thing that Venezuela needs most to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy: national reconciliation. A government that owes a debt to Mr. Bolton and Mr. Abrams will not only be viewed with suspicion by many on the left in Venezuela; it could be forced to abide by constraints imposed by the neoconservatives in Washington about which political actors are considered acceptable partners in a reconciliation process.
The situation in Venezuela is, undoubtedly, difficult. But when it comes to Latin America, Washington has a long history of making difficult situations worse. It is precisely because Venezuela deserves a better government than it currently has that the United States should not play a role in choosing it.
Patrick Iber is a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is the author of “Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America.”
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【梁】【夏】【回】【过】【神】【来】【道】：“【我】【决】【定】【谁】【也】【不】【杀】，【我】【们】【到】【那】【个】【落】【脚】【点】【便】【下】【去】，【利】【用】【所】【娑】【昆】。” 【刀】【疤】【男】：“【你】【想】【清】【楚】【了】【吗】？【他】【知】【道】【你】【不】【可】【告】【人】【的】【秘】【密】。” 【梁】【夏】【笑】【道】：“【你】【不】【也】【同】【样】【知】【道】【了】【我】【不】【可】【告】【人】【的】【秘】【密】，【我】【若】【杀】【了】【他】，【岂】【不】【是】【也】【要】【把】【你】【给】【杀】【了】。” 【小】【黑】【担】【忧】【声】【在】【脑】【海】【里】【响】【起】：“【梁】【夏】，【你】【真】【要】【想】【清】【楚】【了】。” 【梁】【夏】
【门】【口】，【黎】【墨】【的】【车】【子】【停】【在】【那】【里】。 【她】【的】【脚】【步】【渐】【渐】【放】【慢】，【站】【在】【原】【地】【顿】【了】【一】【下】。 【手】【中】【的】【车】【钥】【匙】【微】【微】【捏】【紧】。 【她】【实】【在】【不】【敢】……【抱】【有】【任】【何】【期】【盼】。 【不】【然】，【最】【后】【变】【成】【笑】【话】【的】，【永】【远】【都】【是】【自】【己】。 【见】【她】【半】【天】【不】【动】，【黎】【墨】【放】【下】【车】【窗】，【侧】【头】【冷】【脸】【看】【着】【她】。 “【愣】【什】【么】！【赶】【紧】【上】【车】。” 【许】【清】【知】【眸】【子】【闪】【了】【闪】，【人】【还】【没】【有】【反】【应】【过】
【林】【岛】【也】【是】【这】【样】，【大】【学】【毕】【业】【后】，【林】【岛】【留】【在】【了】B【大】，【继】【续】【读】【研】【究】【生】，【然】【后】【是】【博】【士】。 【由】【于】【贡】【献】【突】【出】，【安】【辰】【还】【被】【奖】【励】【了】【一】【套】B【市】【的】【房】【子】，【和】【林】【岛】【一】【起】【搬】【进】【去】【了】。 【正】【在】【熟】【睡】【的】【林】【岛】【突】【然】【惊】【醒】，【深】【吸】【几】【口】【气】，【赶】【紧】【摸】【摸】【身】【旁】【的】【安】【辰】，【安】【辰】【还】【在】【她】【的】【身】【边】。 【林】【岛】【的】【动】【作】【让】【安】【辰】【也】【醒】【来】【了】，【发】【现】【林】【岛】【的】【精】【神】【不】【是】【很】【好】，【安】【辰】【问】2017年第50期马报资料【今】【天】【食】【堂】【的】【饭】【菜】【是】【依】【雯】【有】【最】【喜】【欢】【的】【炖】【肉】【汤】。 【西】【盟】【的】【学】【院】【自】【然】【不】【是】【标】【准】【意】【义】【上】【的】【大】【锅】【饭】，【但】【是】【为】【了】【保】【证】【学】【生】【的】【膳】【食】【健】【康】，【学】【校】【自】【由】【监】【视】ai【帮】【助】【学】【生】【安】【排】【几】【分】【饭】【菜】，【由】【此】【学】【生】【可】【以】【从】ai【准】【备】【的】【膳】【食】【营】【养】【健】【康】【套】【餐】【中】【任】【选】【一】【份】。 【所】【以】【学】【生】【不】【一】【定】【每】【一】【顿】【都】【能】【吃】【到】【自】【己】【喜】【欢】【的】【饭】【餐】，【更】【多】【往】【往】【是】【混】【杂】【在】【一】【起】，【常】【态】【吃】
【这】【是】【他】【们】【第】【一】【次】【听】【到】【他】【的】【声】【音】。 【经】【过】【之】【前】【说】【的】【话】，【他】【们】【还】【以】【为】【你】【们】【是】【一】【个】【年】【纪】【挺】【大】【的】【人】【呢】。 【没】【想】【到】【声】【音】【是】【如】【此】【的】【年】【轻】，【不】【但】【年】【轻】【就】【跟】【那】【个】【女】【子】【一】【样】【特】【别】【的】【好】【听】。 【甚】【至】【说】【是】【特】【别】【的】【磁】【魅】【微】【微】【压】【低】【声】【线】【的】【时】【候】【特】【别】【的】【苏】。 【红】【衣】【女】【子】【就】【是】【一】【个】【经】【常】【混】【迹】【在】【场】【面】【上】，【什】【么】【人】【都】【见】【过】【的】【老】【手】【了】：“【不】【然】【呢】？【你】【用】【什】
【虽】【然】【很】【不】【想】【失】【去】【全】【勤】，【但】【没】【办】【法】。 【老】【猫】【受】【命】【举】【办】【中】【秋】【活】【动】。 【今】【天】【去】【考】【察】【平】【江】【路】，【太】【累】【了】。 【晚】【上】【回】【去】【还】【要】【协】【商】【奖】【励】【和】【活】【动】【规】【则】，【没】【时】【间】【码】【字】，【所】【以】【鸽】【了】。 【这】【个】【月】【没】【有】【全】【勤】，【还】【要】【举】【办】【汉】【服】【活】【动】，【更】【新】【可】【能】【也】【就】【随】【缘】【了】。 【想】【要】【看】【汉】【服】【小】【姐】【姐】【的】【可】【以】【来】，【万】【分】【抱】【歉】。